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With the rise of ubiquitous computing, the role of HCI and interaction design in making everyday 
futures is becoming ever more encompassing and profound. The articles in this Special Topic offer 
some thought provoking perspectives on how these implications might be researched, understood, 
and challenged.  
 
Future everyday life is certain to be different from today, but how is it shaped in the present? What 
role do technologies and interaction designers have in shaping everyday futures? How might futures 
be made differently, and what theories and methods would be required to do this? These were 
questions that brought together an interdisciplinary group of researchers to form the Everyday 
Futures Network (wp.lancs.ac.uk/everydayfutures) in July 2016 The network was founded with the 
conviction that Everyday Futures is an area ripe for development, tackling head-on the fact that 
futures of work, future homes, city futures and energy futures all make assumptions about, and have 
far reaching implications for everyday lives that are seldom explored.. An inaugural workshop was 
held at Lancaster University's Institute for Social Futures (www.lancaster.ac.uk/social-futures), an 
initiative which aims to make better futures in which the experience of being human on a finite 
planet is made central.   
 
The workshop foregrounded the kinds of methods and analysis available across the disciplines, to 
develop everyday futures, a topic which currently slips between the disciplinary cracks. History, 
sociology and anthropology, though dealing with the lived everyday do not tend to engage with the 
future, while disciplines such as policy, planning, fashion, and interaction design focus on the future, 
through various objects and scales, but rarely from the perspective of everyday life. The workshop 
established an active and engaged network – with a growing membership from a wide variety of 
backgrounds, and produced a collection of nine essays. This collection lays the foundations for an 
original research agenda, and is freely available online through 
wp.lancs.ac.uk/everydayfutures/essay-collection/. 
 
The four articles in this Special Topic are based on a selection of essays from this collection. We have 
worked with the authors, who are from history, design, sociology, environment, management and 
policy to tailor their contributions for HCI researchers and interaction designers. As such, the essays 
provide gateways to other realms of knowledge, approaches and perspectives. In the rest of this 
introduction, we briefly position Everyday Futures as a new interdisciplinary area of research, and 
invite you to join us in this emerging agenda. Indeed, the future is already central within HCI 
research, however, it is primarily approached from the perspective of particular technologies. We 
therefore begin by highlighting three perspectives on 'the future' that are intertwined in the articles 
that follow: researching past futures; identifying traces of the future in the present; and, exploring 
the assumptions about everyday lives that are embedded in future visions. These perspectives are 
valuable for the new light they shed on technologies in everyday life, and therefore by implication 
the roles that HCI researchers and interaction designers might play in shaping everyday futures.  
 A historical focus, such as that explored by Wright and Pooley, highlights that new technologies do 
not enter a vacuum, but rather that they become woven into everyday lives, relationships and ways 
of doing that already exist and work. In this light, it is no wonder that technologies have 
unanticipated effects. Looking in detail at past ways of living and working can provide new 
understandings of the present, and on why interventions (including technologies) have unexpected 
outcomes.  
 
Secondly, viewing the future as performed in the present – which is the focus of Chatterton and 
Newmarch – highlights the diversity of ways of living that exists alongside each other at any moment 
in time, between different cultures and social groups. They argue that some parts of society, 
including technology designers and researchers, have more power than others to decide the types of 
futures that get promoted and prioritized, and reflect on how HCI might reproduce, but also 
challenge such undesirable patterns. One way of achieving this might be through using new methods 
to make future imaginaries and visions. As Wright and Pooley note, imaginaries do not simply 
materialize as envisioned, but they are nevertheless powerful devices for change. Which points to 
the third perspective.  
 
This third theme is the focus of Welch, Keller and Mandich, who point out that all too often future 
visions – like the circular economy – brush over the changed everyday lives essential to their 
realisation. In the article, they show how social theories can help to unpick the relations between 
everyday life and technology in large scale future visions. Complementing this, Meadows and Kouw 
offer a method for developing multiple visions of a better everyday future, which they call collective 
composition, emphasising plurality and potentially conflicting ideas of ‘the good life’, rather than 
seeking a consensus.  
 
The main aim of this special topic is to open up the area of Everyday Futures as new ground to 
explore between disciplines. Though they are far from being the final word, we believe the articles 
offer some compelling new perspectives for HCI research and interaction design. This Special Topic 
forms an invitation to the Interactions readership to join us in pursuit of a better understanding of 
the impact of new technologies on future everyday lives, and to reflect on how, through research 
and design, they might contribute to futures that are more equitable and sustainable.  
 
Those interested can join the network by subscribing to the email list on the website 
(wp.lancs.ac.uk/everydayfutures), and join conversations with #Everydayfuture. We are currently 
organising a second workshop on 'Making Everyday Futures' to be held in July 2017 at the 
Department of Industrial Design of the University of Eindhoven, the Netherlands. The aim of the 
workshop is to experience the making and deployment of artefacts as a way of exploring and 
questioning future everyday life. More details about this workshop, and how to participate will 
become available on the website.   
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Introduction 
We cannot escape the past. It is always with us in our memories, in the physical landscape and 
environment that endures, and in the legacy of past policies and planning decisions at both local and 
global scales. At a personal level we are constantly learning from past actions and experiences, trying 
hard not to repeat previous mistakes, but in terms of policy formulation all too often the decisions 
that are taken today – and which shape the future – seem to ignore the lessons of the past. In this 
essay we argue that planning and policy making would benefit from a greater appreciation of the role 
of the past in shaping the present, and through recognition of the potential benefits of some ways of 
living that have slipped from view. This may help to avoid the sorts of unintended negative 
consequences that have sometimes arisen from past decisions. Clearly how the past is viewed in 
relation to the present and future will depend on the policy goals that exist at the time. These will 
differ as governments (both local and national) change and as external events beyond the control of 
individual governments shape national policies. In this essay we mainly draw examples from the 
United Kingdom and the USA, and make the assumption that two key policy goals of any 
administration must be to create a society that is more equitable and one where resource 
conservation and environmental protection are central objectives. Clearly such aims will interact with 
other goals – most obviously those of economic growth and full employment – but we assume that 
they are not incompatible and, indeed, that in many ways they are dependent on each other.  We 
suggest that by paying closer attention to some aspects of past societies it may be easier to combine 
the goals of greater societal equality, protection of the environment and economic prosperity.  
The principles advanced in this essay could be applied to many aspects of society, economy and 
culture, but we limit ourselves to drawing examples (based on our own research) from two arenas – 
transport and energy. They have been ever present, raise important issues of social equity and 
environmental protection, and are likely to become increasingly important as the twenty-first 
century progresses. We use selected examples drawn from nineteenth and twentieth-century history 
to show that in the connected arenas of transport and energy use some of the structures and 
systems that were common in the past could usefully be replicated today and in the future, not least 
because individuals and families tend to use new technologies to maintain existing life styles. We first 
review some of the existing connections between historical research and visions of the future, 
second we assess the sources that may be used and some of their limitations and, third, we examine 
selected past predictions of future technologies. In conclusion we return to the practical advantages 
of focusing policy on aspects of the everyday in the past, present and future. 
History and the future 
It is often suggested by politicians and policy makers that the public are resistant to change and that 
the adoption of transport or energy policies that restrict (for instance) car use or household energy 
consumption to conserve resources and reduce carbon emissions would be unacceptable to many. 
However, by collecting evidence from oral histories of past travel behaviour it can be demonstrated 
that when transport systems have changed in the past people have altered their travel behaviour 
with relative ease (for instance shifting from trams to motor buses in British cities in the mid-
twentieth century). Similarly, evidence from diaries demonstrates that travellers in the past have 
been very adaptable and resilient in the face of transport difficulties and have altered their behaviour 
as circumstances changed around them. Although transport and energy infrastructures have changed 
dramatically over time the basic needs and priorities of individuals and families (such as shelter, work 
and food) have not, and people rapidly adapted their behaviour to cope with fresh circumstances 
and to maintain their everyday lives. Historical evidence also suggests that the transport and energy 
systems that people used in the past could be more equitable than some of those available today, for 
instance in the nineteenth century all but the very wealthy travelled and heated their homes in 
similar ways. Therefore, transport-related social exclusion was less marked than it is today when life 
often becomes difficult for people without access to a car. Historical evidence suggests that people 
could adapt quickly to the introduction of technologies that reduced the energy demands of 
transport and other everyday activities. Such policies could also help to reduce inequalities within 
society (Pooley, 2016). 
Calls for a greater connection between past, present and future in policymaking are not new, but 
they do remain limited. The on-line platform History and Policy (www.historyandpolicy.org) has 
existed since 2002 and provides a vibrant forum where historians can engage with current policy 
issues. Other more recent publications have also argued for the need for historians to become more 
engaged with the present and future, including in the fields of transport and energy policy (Guldi and 
Armitage, 2014; Divall et al., 2016). However, there is little evidence in Britain that engagement by 
politicians and policy makers is more than superficial. This contrasts with the situation in some parts 
of continental Europe where, for instance, in the Netherlands historical researchers are embedded in 
one the country’s main planning structures (Toussaint, 2016). One of the more common ways in 
which historical material has traditionally been utilised in planning and policy making is in the 
forecasting of long-term economic and demographic trends to produce different future scenarios. 
Past time series of data may be used to extrapolate future trends while changing key parameters 
such as birth and death rates or economic growth to produce different scenarios. However, such 
techniques can only provide a macro-scale perspective and are often undermined by rapidly 
changing circumstances or by the unpredictable behaviour of individuals and organizations.  
Researching everyday pasts  
In spite of the dominance of this macro perspective, historical archives hold a wealth of information 
about past everyday life, providing a micro perspective for policy makers and planners. Journals, oral 
histories, advertisements, news media, magazines, instruction manuals, policy documents, film, art 
and literature, are a few of the many available sources from which details about everyday life can be 
gleaned. From these sources we can collect anecdotes about the use of technologies, personal 
habits, routines, cultural norms, and preferences, as well as expectations about the future. Diaries, 
for example, contain musings on mundane details, from information about the daily commute 
through to reflections on the evening meal. Oral histories capture memories of the past documenting 
personal reflections and anecdotal evidence of emotional engagements with living environments. 
Instruction manuals record appliances and point towards their intended use. Popular advertising, 
lifestyle magazines and marketing material reveal cultural meanings attached to products. Cultural 
artefacts similarly act as a depositary for evidence about past models of everyday life. Novels, 
biographies, and political tracts are littered with references to everyday practices. In addition to 
written sources, visual culture is equally revealing about the ways everyday lives have been 
structured. Photography, both professional and amateur, documents the changing space of the 
home, capturing arrangements of objects and trends of decoration. Film captures social practices 
unfolding over time. The post-war British genre of Kitchen Sink Realism, for example, tells us much 
about the social customs and living practices of factory workers in the 1950s.  
Each of these sources has limitations, posing challenges for a historian of everyday life. Policy 
documents chart transformations at a governmental level, but as top-down documents they reveal 
little about how people experienced and lived these changes. Instruction manuals, advertisements, 
and industry periodicals, provide information about how manufacturers intended their appliances to 
be used, but consumers did not always use products as intended. Furthermore, in the words of Joy 
Parr, it is the ‘embodied histories’ that are excluded from the historical archive. Tacit knowledge, Parr 
points out, is recorded through the body in lived practices rather than in textual or representational 
forms (Parr, 2010). Historical sources privilege certain senses, with sight traditionally being prioritised 
over touch and smell. This hierarchy feeds into the type of historical documents available, with 
academic traditions being ‘deeply invested in texts and in textual critique as the arbiter of research 
results’ (Parr, 2010, p. 3). To overcome this weighting, Parr has created a website the Megaprojects 
New Media series (http://megaprojects.uwo.ca) to explore new ways of capturing ‘embodied 
histories’ lost to text.  
Genre and form also structure information about everyday practices, determining what data is 
included and omitted.  Biographies, personal diaries and film, for instance, exist within established 
traditions where literary conventions determine what information is included in each type of source, 
from the intimate, to the heroic and fantastical. The final constraint is practical. Sifting through 
historical sources requires time and labour. Moreover, there is a tendency towards diminishing 
returns when hours are spent transcribing illegible handwriting to find only the occasional detail 
about a journey to work or bath-time routine. Even once this information has been retained there 
continue to be challenges in extracting data in a coherent manner. The digitalisation of historical 
archives and the emergence of new research methodologies from the field of the Digital Humanities 
are making these practical limitations easier to handle. Functions such as word searches, data mining 
and frequency charts also provide new avenues for historians looking to locate trends and patterns in 
large bodies of material. However, there is a danger that this focuses research on those sources that 
are available in digital form, ignoring others that might give a different perspective.  
Past futures  
Records of past futures also reveal avenues not taken. Multiple futures co-existed in the past. Some 
were borne out and others failed to materialise. National forecasts, such as the 1952 U.S. report 
Resources for Freedom (otherwise known as the Paley Report), predicted that by 1975 U.S. aggregate 
energy consumption would be roughly double the amount consumed in 1950. This turned out to be a 
conservative estimate as U.S. energy consumption rose from 36.5 in 1950 to 75.8 exajoules (EJ) in 
1975. In contrast, its suggestion that by 1975 the maximum plausible market for solar energy could 
be as large as 13 million installations in homes (contributing to 10 per cent of the nation’s energy 
system) was an example of a possible future that has so far not come to pass. Other futures played 
an active role in shaping energy infrastructures. During the 1950s and 1960s, for example, private 
utilities in the United States published exaggerated forecasts for electricity consumption, circulating 
alarmist predictions about how consumption would soon outstrip supply. These predictions 
influenced the rapid construction of new generating capacity, which was soon made obsolete as 
electricity consumption fell during the 1970s. Social practices also vary greatly from country to 
country, leading to very different trajectories in the adoption of new technologies. For example, 82 
per cent of American households own a tumble dryer, compared to 57 per cent in Britain and 5 per 
cent in Italy (Fischer, 2013). New technologies must always be located within specific cultural, 
environmental and political contexts.  
Many futures failed to materialise. Science fiction futures (strikingly captured in the 1960s TV series 
the Jetsons) never came into being, and neither did Maynard Keynes’ 15-hour working week forecast 
in 1930. Products, such as the 1950s all-electric doghouse, never found a mass market – closing 
down, until recently, a potentially lucrative energy market in pet upkeep. The failure of particular 
technologies and futures demonstrates the role of path dependence through the ways that people 
adhere to familiar or dominant technologies. For instance, the decision to cook with gas or electricity 
remains driven as much by historical inertia as by personal choice, as costs and infrastructures 
conflict with cultural preferences and cooking habits. This exposes the tension between the 
inevitability and malleability of the futures that came to structure everyday life. Futures have a 
momentum but they can also be shaped.  
Conclusions 
Recent events across the globe have demonstrated that the ambitions and policies adopted by 
governments are often disconnected from the everyday values and actions of individuals and 
families. This is evident, for instance, in the increasing public distrust of political parties and of expert 
opinion in Europe and the USA, and in the British vote in June 2016 to leave the EU. Most policy is 
formulated at a macro-scale be it concerned with climate change, global inequalities, trade 
agreements or coping with the movement of large numbers of migrants from conflict zones. In 
contrast, individual people live their lives at the micro-scale, negotiating work, housing, family and 
community on a daily basis and with little real engagement with national and global concerns beyond 
passive observation through news media. For instance, research on attitudes towards greater use of 
walking and cycling for everyday transport has demonstrated that people are most likely to see 
benefits in terms of their personal health and improvements to the local environment, and are less 
likely to adopt sustainable travel because of concerns about global climate change. Similar attitudes 
have also been shown for other aspects of energy consumption and carbon reduction. We suggest 
that the analysis of past transport and energy scenarios may help to identify ways in which this 
apparent disconnect may be at least partially remedied. For instance, it is clearly sensible to 
encourage people to undertake more short trips on foot or by bike whenever feasible rather than 
using a car. In the past walking was by far the most important form of everyday transport for most 
people, and in the mid-twentieth century in Britain cycling was commonly used by many men in 
particular as their preferred form of everyday transport. The reasons for this are not hard to deduce. 
First, there were far fewer alternatives: many people had little option but to walk in nineteenth-
century Britain. Second, the physical structure of urban areas meant that most people lived close to 
their workplace and that many of the goods and services that people needed could be found 
relatively close to their homes. Clearly it is not sensible or possible to return to nineteenth-century 
patterns of life, but we do suggest that transport and energy systems that minimize inequalities 
between users and maximize sustainable energy use – and which to some extent replicate past 
structures – are both feasible and desirable. For most individuals the factors that are important to 
them and their families have changed little over time, and when new technologies are developed 
people often use them in ways that maintain existing patterns of living. Greater appreciation of some 
of the benefits of past patterns of everyday living may help to produce more equitable, sustainable 
and convenient systems of transport and energy use today and in the future. 
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The future….is not evenly distributed 
This title quote from the American speculative fiction author William Gibson (Gibson, 2012) alludes 
primarily to the fact that the things that will constitute the ‘normal’ or ‘everyday’ within the lives of 
those living in the future, already exist for some today. Most of what will constitute change, at least 
in the short- to mid-term, is simply the spread of these niche, or minority, ‘things’ to become more 
pervasive.  However, Gibson’s quote can also be interpreted by considering that ‘the future’ itself will 
be characterised by inequalities in a way that is similar to the present.  In order that these 
inequalities are not reproduced, or that their reproduction is minimised, it is necessary to ensure that 
those processes in the present which ‘write’ the future are not irredeemably tainted by these same 
inequalities.  
 
It is hard to clearly identify what elements of the present will become more widespread in the future. 
Over the 20th Century, social transitions in the West have often involved the trappings of wealth 
becoming more accessible to wider sections of society, such as automobility, better quality housing, 
high quality healthcare and consumer technology. Many contemporary future scenarios present the 
future to be a utopia of wealth and health furnished by a panoply of high-tech gadgets and permitted 
by continued economic growth. However, it is also possible that the future for some, or all, will 
involve either a gradual or rapid reduction in standards of living. Thus, the future might consist of the 
expansion of the current lifestyles of either the rich and powerful, or of the poor and oppressed.  
 
The future is always created on uneven foundations. In order to understand how we can create 
futures that do not exclude, isolate or exploit we have to understand how the future is written in the 
present. More specifically, we are interested in how minority elements are, in this moment, 
unequally distributed; how these inequalities are likely to be reproduced or altered in the future; and 
how these inequalities may actually determine what future or futures we arrive at. Through 
exploring how existing differences create unequal futures, we can begin to understand how to look 
forward in a way that is beneficial to those who are often excluded from mainstream narratives of 
change. 
 
By considering three key domains of the social, the spatial and the temporal, this essay will briefly 
describe some of the ways in which we may be able to see the future as being unequally distributed 
in the present.  It will then consider what impact these distributional inequalities play with regard to 
those who may play a significant role in attempting to write the future. We close by offering some 
possible ways of dealing with inequality that involve technologies. 
 
Social Inequalities 
It is often the case that certain social groups (identifiable by gender, class, race, physical ability, etc.) 
are omitted from official/institutional visions of the future created by experts (politicians, managers, 
interaction designers), be that intentionally or not. However, because these visions shape policies 
and technologies that affect everyone, these social inequalities open up questions of power.  
Moreover, the unofficial futures of everyday experience, hopes, dreams and imaginations are often 
not considered in these future visions.  
 
Efforts to incorporate everybody in views of the future often result in dystopian images, because 
they highlight current differences in exaggerated ways. Science Fiction literature offers some clear 
examples. J.G. Ballard’s 1975 novel High Rise, presents us with a fictional interpretation of class and 
futures which is useful when assessing how social inequalities within the everyday are constructed 
and consumed. In the novel, class divide is physical (the higher the floor in Ballard’s tower block, the 
higher the class of resident).  Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932) also portrays fundamental 
inequalities at the heart of the imagined society, though here these are built into genetics and 
conditioning, not just architecture.  
 
Whilst these fictional futures extend and emphasise current inequalities, in many ways, fragments of 
utopia exist already. For example, in the 'Western world', the majority of people can access clean 
drinking water in such sufficiency that they flush their toilets with it; calorific food in such quantity 
that they can become obese; and free health care to treat the consequences. It might be churlish to 
expect utopia to only exist as an endpoint or final destination. Such a view highlights that we should 
recognise and cherish these fragments as and when we find them, and realise that it may be 
necessary to fight hard to keep them. 
 
Spatial Inequalities 
The rural-urban divide is one spatial axis that highlights differences that are apparent across 
potential elements of the future. Access to new transport modes such as car clubs or Uber are 
increasingly available in cities but have little reach into rural areas. It is questionable how far these 
sorts of systems will be able to practically reach these areas, highlighting how different futures may 
emerge as a result of location. Moving from physical mobility to virtual mobility, access to high speed 
internet is another example of something that is ‘the present’ in urban areas and may soon 
constitute a (relatively near) future for rural ones.  
 
In terms of global distributions of lifestyles and wealth, the late twentieth century and early twenty-
first century have seen an increasing dispersion of modern, westernised, ‘middle class’ lifestyles from 
Europe, North America and Australasia, to parts of Asia, South America and Africa.  In the latter we 
can see a rapid transition towards futures that are very different to their recent pasts, due to 
extended energy supply networks, availability of consumer goods or the introduction of emergent 
technologies, such as the internet.  In parallel, the last decade has also seen what might be 
considered by some as less ‘progressive’ futures developing, such as the descent into civil war and 
collapse of infrastructure in parts of the Middle East (e.g. Syria and Iraq) as well as uneven 
distributions of the consequences of the global financial crash hitting Portugal, Italy, Greece and 
Spain particularly harshly.  
 
Sometimes though, space causes less of a divide. Mobile phones provide a fascinating case study of 
how fast a new technology can establish itself globally, rapidly levelling access to the services that a 
technology can provide. Mobile phones highlight not only the speed with which futures can arrive, 
but also a ‘virtual’ shift in the everyday, from one which is only experienced through direct contact to 
one where connections are not just physical. Here the future may also hark further back to the past. 
Computing and the virtual realm can be seen as an extension of the oracles and shamans of the past 
(Davis, 2015), our desire for knowledge and foretelling is transplanted from chicken entrails to 
Wikipedia and social media. We haven’t moved far from the past, and the past will always remain 
with us, as Wright and Pooley discuss. 
 
Social media highlights the nature of ‘information inequality’. During a time of ‘post-truth’, 
access to information and how we use it has become a vital part of our present. From 
initiatives to develop algorithms to reduce information overload bringing undesirable 
consequences such as Eli Pariser's "Filter bubbles’’ to dubious initiatives such as Facebook's 
infamous experiment of tweaking people's timelines to affect their emotions 
(http://www.forbes.com/sites/dailymuse/2014/08/04/the-facebook-experiment-what-it-
means-for-you/#1a63a08e1cbc). Personal newsfeeds often dictate the information that is 
visible to users and access to (good quality) information may be thought as more important 
and influential than ever before. Thus spatial inequalities can extend into virtual/cyber 
space. 
    
Temporal Inequalities 
Short-term events and disruptions such as blackouts and supply chain disruptions represent snippets 
of insight into more precarious unstable futures, as increasing energy consumption and aging 
generating plants mean that energy supply systems become progressively overloaded. Disruptions to 
systems may appear sudden, but they occur within the context of long build ups of dependencies and 
allow not just for a greater understanding of the nature of innovation in the moment, but also reveal 
much about the undisrupted, everyday ‘normal’. What is taken for granted now (e.g. a reliable 
energy supply, or a stable climate) cannot be taken for granted in the future. 
 
But how should these potential future disruptions be handled? Are we just trying to maintain the 
current system to stop an unstable future? If so, for whom is the current system actually stable? 
What is considered disruption in the first place?  This is clearly relative, because in many other parts 
of the world, black/brownouts are considered normal. 
 
Temporal inequalities can also manifest across generations: the aging population may be a picture of 
the future for today’s young. Although attempting to avoid the consequences of aging has been a 
long-time concern of much of the human race, this has, in the modern West, led to a failure to 
adequately consider the well-being of the old.  By improving life for those who are old now, younger 
sections of society could help design the future for themselves when that time comes. 
 
At the other end of the age spectrum, the comfort with technology shown by Generation Z/‘Digital 
Natives’ provides an insight for older sections of society as to how digital technology can rapidly 
become a given within everyday life. But it is not just in technological practices that a generation gap 
may be widening.  In 2016, both the 2016 UK Referendum on leaving the European Union, and the 
US General Election showed very significant differences in voting patterns between the young and 
the old.  In both these cases it appears there has been a tension between those whose views have 
been ignored for the last three decades and those who haven’t had voices yet (the young).  It seems 
that the youth vote lost out, potentially condemning them to live in societies determined by victors 
who won’t live to see them played out fully. 
 
Structural Inequalities 
The three domains above - social, spatial and temporal - are just three ways of identifying 
inequalities. What matters most, we argue, is not whether differences exist, but the extent to which 
they result from the way society and institutions work (as opposed to say ‘individual choice’). When 
they arise from social structures, and particularly when leading to negative impacts, these become 
issues of inequality that should be a concern from a justice perspective.  How these differences 
become structural inequalities is usually related to issues of power. Unequal power relationships 
determine who gets to write the future, at least at a macro level, for example, through decisions 
about long-term infrastructure provision and the built environment, corporate (R&D) strategies, 
government policies and research agenda's that will shape many people’s everyday lives for years to 
come.  These decisions are often made by a particular section of society – typified by being white, 
(upper) middle class and male.  Although the demographics of decision-makers are now beginning to 
broaden, many of the organisational structures in which these decisions are made constrain the 
ability for ideas from outside the cultural mind-sets of these groups to have much traction.  
Additionally, incomes associated with these types of positions mean that where people from other 
class backgrounds enter these roles, they often become separated from the day to day experiences 
of those from similar situations, for example believing that if they have ‘made good’ then this is 
possible for any and all.  However, even when apparently benign, current differences in power have a 
strong impact on how the future is being written. For example, the power of people like Bill Gates 
and Mark Zuckerberg to deploy their wealth in prioritising medical rather than public health research 
and action determines wider contexts of what a future free from global disease will look like. 
 
Dealing with Inequality 
How can we move forward to a more equitable future? From a Marxist perspective, many of the 
inequalities described above arise from discrepancies in access to and control of capital. Marx saw a 
potential for automation to relieve the worker from the mindless tasks brought about by the division 
of labour.  150 years later the very real issue of wide-scale automation offers a mechanism through 
which to assess class and everyday futures. Incorporating a new economic model that is being 
posited not as utopian socialism, but rather Postcapitalism. Automation is often viewed as the reason 
for workers losing jobs, zero-hour contracts and a lower standard of living. However, recent work 
(Mason, 2015; Srnicek and Williams, 2015), highlights how the increase of technology that eliminates 
aspects of labour may see the future change in a way that is beneficial to those who have till now 
depended on state welfare and been excluded. Through becoming part of a narrative that views 
leisure and reduced work as integral to the everyday, the un/underemployed will be able to ‘demand 
the future’ and become stronger participants in their own futures, rather than having their lives 
dictated by the structures of labour that are currently in place. The extreme view is that increased 
technologies in the workplace will allow for everyone to work less, resulting in what Srnicek and 
Williams (2015) call ‘fully automated luxury communism’.  Other views of the future have been put 
forward that, rather than automating all work, propose a refocusing on work that is less efficient 
whilst being more fulfilling.  For example, Jackson (2011) in Prosperity Without Growth, potentially 
reflecting William Morris’ (1885) Useful Work versus Useless Toil, suggests a vision of the future 
where worth and meaning might be seen as something to be obtained through work, rather than as 
something to be purchased from proceeds of work.  This may, however, need to be partly obtained 
through automation of drudgery. 
 
How automation will be deployed and how the wealth generated from automated processes will be 
distributed is currently unclear.  It is far from certain that automation will be used to create a better 
everyday for all. The futures described in the works listed above may not be that different from the 
present, yet they can provide a way for inequalities within wage income and work processes to be 
considered. Alongside full automation, is the idea of a universal basic income, a concept already 
being suggested as part of an everyday future in several countries, such as a recent experiment in 
Utrecht, Holland and a referendum in Switzerland (The Guardian, 2016). Basic income is a 
guaranteed unconditional amount of money, regardless of employment or social position. Changing 
economic and social infrastructure in such a way means state welfare becomes something beneficial 
to all. However, the idea that a person should be entitled to payment for being a citizen of a certain 
state is controversial, perhaps because those who are already financially stable view a livelihood as 
something which people have to earn and are not necessarily entitled to.  This highlights the 
importance of developing social and cultural change alongside technological changes. 
 
Futures narratives require an understanding of how inequalities could be changed, culturally, 
economically and politically. Significant change in current systems may be more likely to occur (at a 
large level) from the bottom up via revolution than from the top down – indeed Morris clearly saw 
that the wealthy would not relinquish their power without a struggle. The voices of some who have 
perceived their influence as being diminished over the last few decades, are now being heard to call 
an end to the future being “more of the same”. These struggles can be seen to be not about what the 
future will actually be like, but simply about the ability to have a stake in its writing. In recent years 
social protests and networks dedicated to changing social standings have increased in visibility. For 
example, the #BlackLivesMatter network (www.blacklivesmatter.com) highlights the ways in which 
black people are deprived of certain rights by the state and ‘intentionally left powerless’. Creating a 
movement that is both digital (the use of the hashtag in the network’s name is demonstrative of its 
dependence on digital technologies and social media) and physical (through protests), shows how 
those who have an unequal footing in certain structures are changing their position and getting 
others to change as well. In order for injustices to be remedied in the future, they must be addressed 
now.  The longer they are left, the more embedded they will become.  
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Talk of the ‘Circular Economy’ has grown in recent years. Today it’s central to both EU policy and the 
design philosophy of Jaguar Land Rover. Consulting firm McKinsey estimates it could add $1trillion to 
the global economy by 2025. Brad Pitt is a devotee.  
 
The Circular Economy is offered as a blueprint for an alternative future to the current linear economy 
of “make, use, dispose”.  It’s a model for an environmentally sustainable economy, resilient in the 
face of resource insecurity and ecological crisis. The European Commission recently reframed its 
commitments to sustainable production and consumption in terms of the concept, and in 2015 
published an “action plan for the Circular Economy” (EC 2015). And a number of NGOs and think 
tanks, notably the Ellen MacArthur Foundation in the UK, have championed the notion.  
 
Projects and visions of collective futures mobilise—sometimes conflicting—understandings of the 
common good. And they often embody assumptions and implicit models of everyday life—in the 
case of Circular Economy, crucially, models of consumption. As cultural sociologist Ann Mische puts 
it, imagined futures play a critical role in “processes of critique, problem-solving, and social 
intervention” (Mische, 2014: 440). Imagined futures can come to serve as visions guiding public or 
corporate policy, channel funding (as is very much the case with the Circular Economy at the EU 
level), have the power to influence technological design, and shape assumptions about how citizens, 
designers and other professionals engage with future-oriented societal projects. Analysing visions, 
models and public debate about possible futures is an important task. Imagined futures—whether 
political utopias, models in public policy or expectations in business planning—pave the roads 
towards the actual future.  
 
As the Ellen MacArthur Foundation imagine the Circular Economy , the very concept of waste would 
be eliminated. Resources and materials would circle through the economy on the model of a nutrient 
cycle in natural ecosystems— ‘industrial symbiosis’. Circular Economy draws on an inheritance from 
the field of ’industrial ecology’ and ‘cradle-to-cradle’ design (Braungart and McDonough, 2002). Even 
the principle of “efficiency” would be replaced in the Circular Economy. The concept of efficiency 
carries within it the industrial logic of the coal-powered steam engine—“efficiency” is defined as the 
ratio of useful output to total input. In the Circular Economy this is replaced by ”eco-effectiveness”—
as social scientists Jo Mylan and colleagues put it, “highlighting the potentially infinite contribution of 
materials to the generation of value” (Mylan, et al., 2016: 2). Idealized visions of the Circular 
Economy are of a new industrial revolution, with products designed for extended lifetimes and with 
near-infinitely recyclable materials and components forming a zero-waste ‘closed-loop’. 
 
 
So how are ‘everyday futures’ imagined in the Circular Economy?  We apply insights from sociology 
concerning future projections, consumption and conventions of the common good to   thinking about 
Circular Economy from the EU and the national contexts of Estonia, Italy, and the UK. 
Circular Economy and the European Union 
The level of engagement with the project of Circular Economy varies widely across the EU. In the UK, 
government has been scaling back work on Circular Economy, as part of a general disengagement 
from active sustainability policy making. On the other hand, UK think tanks, often in collaboration 
with business and academia, have been active in promoting the concept. In Estonia, the situation is 
reversed. On the formal level, government policy is tightly engaged with EU developments, however 
there is little civil society, academic or media engagement with the concept. Italy is similarly 
politically engaged, playing a very active role at EU level.  
 
We take as an entry point the observation of Jo Mylan and colleagues (2016) that current models of 
the Circular Economy fall short in how they understand ‘consumption’ and ‘consumers’. And as they 
put it, there’s a particular “lack of attention paid to the domestic sphere, an important site and space 
for the practices which shape how and why consumers use particular products and services, how 
waste is generated, and ultimately how this might be changed” (Mylan et al, 2014: 2).  
 
Some widespread definitions of the Circular Economy tend to elide the domain of everyday life and 
consumption, even as the ‘use’ stage remains the central pivot to the entire model, as in this 
definition from the Ellen MacArthur Foundation: 
 
"A circular economy keeps products, components and materials at their highest utility and 
value, at all times, eliminating the concept of waste, with materials ultimately re-entering the 
economy at end of use as defined, valuable technical or biological nutrients." 
 
Compare here the centrality of “Consumer” and “User” in a widely reproduced graphical 




Fig. 1: Ellen MacArthur Foundation model of the Circular Economy 
 
While ‘user’ and ‘consumer’ are separate in this graphic, they do not relate to distinct processes, 
leaving any implied distinction unclear. The centrality of use and consumption is routinely 
acknowledged in reports and policy statements. An Estonian Government press release rehearses a 
common pattern in policy documents, welcoming changes to the EU Ecodesign Directive that will 
“enhance the reparability, durability, and recyclability of products” whilst offering little to nothing in 
terms of concrete visions of everyday life and forms of consumption in which products will be 
routinely repaired, not replaced, and recycled. Between the design stage on the one hand and, on 
the other, the end-of-life (waste management and resource recovery) of ‘circular’ products, the use 
stage of products in the Circular Economy and their users are largely absent.  Yet, the same press 
release assumes the role of the consumer in everyday life to be crucial, with the Minister of the 
Environment stressing that: “Fulfilling the set objectives implies everyone’s contribution [including] 
reasonable and conscious behaviour of individuals [which] reduces needless consumption” (ibid). 
Typically for political discourse on environmental sustainability, the consumer here is portrayed 
almost in caricature as a rational agent—‘homo economicus’. At the same time, however, the 
consumer’s assumed engagement with the project of Circular Economy implies a strong motivational 
commitment towards radically changed norms and practices of consumption. And yet any context in 
which those changes might be assumed to take place is entirely unexplored.  
 
Consumption does feature within the EU Action Plan (EC 2015). However, here again we note the 
restrictive, individualised model through which consumption is framed. The action plan section on 
“Consumption” begins: 
 
“The choices made by millions of consumers can support or hamper the circular economy. 
These choices are shaped by the information to which consumers have access, the range and 
prices of existing products, and the regulatory framework.” (EC 2015: 6) 
 
And proceeds to largely rehearse the conventional tools through which sustainable consumption 
policy has been framed by the EU since its outset: eco-labelling, price incentives, household waste 
reduction and recycling. Social scientific scholarship on consumption has come to reject this overly-
individualised model (see Warde and Southerton, 2012). Instead, consumption has come to be 
understood as individual performances of everyday, social practices—like driving, cooking, parenting, 
playing sports and so on.  
 
This social practice oriented understanding of consumption alters the position and nature of the 
consumer. Firstly, against mainstream understandings of consumption—reflected in the examples  
above— in which the consumer is characterised as rational, utility-maximising ‘homo economicus’, 
the contemporary practice approach to consumption  stresses the habitual, embodied and 
unreflective aspects of consumption. Secondly, the figure of ‘the consumer’ is decentred from 
accounts of consumption, which foreground rather dynamic relations between practices—such as for 
example how eating practices are conditioned by the temporal rhythms and spatial locations of work 
practices.  
 
In other words, current models of Circular Economy tend to naively construe the changes in patterns 
of consumption necessary for achieving the large-scale social and technological change they 
presuppose as shifts in individual consumption choices understood as “conscious behaviour”. They 
import the figure of ‘the consumer—with all its baggage—into the ‘use’ phase of the model. A social 
scientifically informed account, by contrast, underscores the need to attend to transformations in 
dynamically related social practices and the technologies with which they are intertwined (see Mylan 
et al. 2016). Consumption in social practice theory is expanded beyond acquisition to refer to a 
‘moment’ in almost all social practices, in which goods or services are involved (Warde, 2005). From a 
sustainability point of view we can understand this moment as the consumption of energy and 
resources.  
 
Circular Economy as a New Model of Consumption 
The EU Action Plan does note “innovative forms of consumption” (EC 2015: 7) as supporting the 
development of the Circular Economy and thus gestures towards imagined novel practices of 
consumption. Here the Action Plan rehearses a common collection of elements: “sharing products or 
infrastructure (collaborative economy), consuming services rather than products, or using IT or 
digital platforms” (ibid.). It recognizes that moving to a circular economy will require changes in how 
people consume products and services. Business and think tank discourse on the Circular Economy 
tends to frame the future of everyday life in terms of radical change, “profound transformational 
opportunity” as the Ellen MacArthur Foundation puts it (EMF 2013), conceived largely through the 
disruptive effects of digital technologies, ubiquitous computing, ‘big data’ and social media, and the 
reconfiguration of consumption and work practices that these trends produce. And note, this places 
a major responsibility on the HCI research and design community. “Collaborative consumption” and 
models of “product-service systems” are routinely invoked here, suggesting a profound shift away 
from private ownership of products to a new service model of provision. The Ellen MacArthur 
Foundation describes this as: 
 
“A new model of collaborative consumerism —in which consumers embrace services that 
enable them to access products on demand rather than owning them—and collaborative 
consumption models that provide more interaction between consumers, retailers, and 
manufacturers.” (EMF 2013: 10) 
 
This imagined “collaborative consumerism” is also a more community-based and localised economy, 
in some of its circuits at least. What is imagined here is a future of consumption that embraces not 
only novel business models and consumption practices, but novel norms of consumption and 
emotional and motivational engagements in consumption as well.  
We note here how Circular Economy discourse conflates with the problematic framing of the 
“Sharing Economy”. Both draw on quite distinct existing elements projected into an imagined future 
of consumption transformed—grass roots projects such as novel digital platforms to share goods and 
services (such as Freecycle and Streetbank) on the one hand, and ‘disruptive’ capitalist enterprises 
such as Uber and AirBnB on the other. 
 
In so doing such models of Circular or Sharing Economy obscure the deeply conflicting orientations 
that these different elements manifest. Imagined futures such as “collaborative consumerism” tend 
to be projected from deeply contradictory trends— intensifications of commercialisation (such as 
AirBnB) on the one hand, and trends of de-commercialisation, such as digital platforms enabling 
sharing (such as Streetbank) on the other. As such, they downplay conflict between these 
orientations, and ignore the very different forms of moral justification they draw upon. 
 
Orders of Worth  
Cultural analysis alerts us to different “orders of worth” (Boltanski and Thevenot, 2006), or different 
conventional values that are drawn upon to justify courses of action—such as organizational change, 
or, as in Circular Economy, the future orientation of society as a whole. Such orders of worth draw 
upon distinctive understandings. Thus, the market order of worth seeks justification through 
understandings of profit maximization and competition. The industrial order draws upon notions of 
productivity, efficiency and instrumentality. The ecological order of worth, by contrast, draws upon 
notion of sustainability, conservation and natural limits. Such orders may complement one another 
relatively unproblematically—but they may also conflict. 
 
Notable in the EU Action Plan’s “Consumption” section (EC 2015) is the absence of general 
statements of value or morally-framed calls to action, the effect of which is to frame the domain of 
consumption within default market and industrial orders of worth. Notable, then, is not only the 
absence of an ecological order of worth, but any gesture beyond the model of industrial efficiency 
towards “eco-effectiveness” through which the Circular Economy claims to distinguish itself (Mylan 
et al., 2016).  
 
Justification processes in official government texts are generally not very elaborate, drawing upon 
taken for granted, naturalised key-words, such as “sustainable” and “competitive”. In our Estonian 
example the ecological, industrial and market orders of worth are all invoked, adjectives signalling 
different orders are placed side by side, eliminating conflict between them, and normalising an 
imagined future that sets competition, efficiency and ecological sustainability in harmony: 
 
“Estonia supports most of the measures in the Circular Economy Package of the European 
Commission, which aim to promote the growth of competitive and sustainable economy in 
the European Union by increasing more effective and sustainable implementation of 
resources within the entire product value chain.”  
 
We note here that while such collisions of the market and ecological orders may signal contradiction 
and conflict, some management theorists argue such dissonance may act as a form of ”strategic 
ambiguity” which enables very different constituencies, say corporations and green NGOs, to work 
together without having to resolve fundamental differences. This noted, it is unclear what the 
relationship is between the kinds of circularity in the Circular Economy that maximise profits and the 
kinds of circularity maximising environmental benefits. Whether this is a fundamental contradiction 
or a productive “strategic ambiguity” only time will tell. 
 
Ann Mische (2014) suggests that narrative and even grammar in documents suggests how different 
groups understand social and technological change. In our final example, an Italian Environment 
Ministry document, we note how there is almost no rhetorical extension toward the future. In other 
words, the necessary long term future orientation of an ecological order of worth is missing. The 
word future very rarely appears, the present tense is prevalent and future-characterizing nouns (such 
as aspirations, challenge, progress, vision etc.) are noticeable by their absence. What seems to be at 
stake is more the short-term destiny of the Italian economy than the long-term environmental 
future. The transition to a Circular Economy is presented as a resource for improving the 
competitiveness of the Italian economic system: 
 
"Here is an entrepreneurship that believes in Italy and in Europe, which knows to bet on an 
innovation environment, now a decisive element for competitiveness in the global market. 
[And which] serves to project ourselves in the only possible future, the circular economy and 
sustainable development as the cornerstone of doing business.”  
 
In our Italian example we find the market order of worth the primary frame, with the ecological 
frame little more than a new marketing strategy for Italian economic competitiveness.  
 
Conclusions 
In this article we show how resources from social science and cultural analysis can help us analyse 
imagined futures. Imagined futures do not lie over the temporal horizon. They are very much in the 
here and now. They condition our imaginative relation to the future, and how we understand social 
and technological change—the future projections of our societies. In doing so they have very real 
effects—in terms, for example, of the allocation of resources, political attention and professional 
expertise, and of individuals’ capacity to imaginatively project themselves into wider social 
programmes. And imagined futures contribute to path dependencies—roads left untrodden and 
possibilities unimagined on the one hand, and avenues opened up, and novel routes taken on the 
other.  
 
We’ve seen how the imagined futures of the Circular Economy often elide everyday life, even whilst 
acknowledging the centrality of consumption to the model. More expansive imaginaries of everyday 
futures posit radically changed forms of consumption, such as “collaborative consumerism”. But 
these imagined everyday futures assume norms and patterns of consumption transformed, whilst 
offering little by way of projected context which might show how such changes will come about. On 
top of this, they draw on potentially fundamentally incompatible justifications, or orders of worth. 
 
We live in times of a widely acknowledged crisis of political imagination, a crisis in the imagined 
futures of social democracy and capitalism, often characterised as a collective failure to imaginatively 
project progressive social and technological change. In that context, engaging critically with imagined 
futures of everyday life is crucial work, not least for those working to materialize them into new 
technologies. In this article we illustrate how theoretic 'tools' from cultural and social theory might 
be of help in this pursuit. 
 
References 
Boltanski, L. and Thévenot, L. (2006) On Justification: Economies of Worth.  Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press 
Braungart, M. and McDonough, W. (2002) Cradle to Cradle: Remaking the Way We Make 
Things London: Vintage Books 
Mische, A. (2014) "Measuring futures in action: projective grammars in the Rio+20 debates" 
Theory and Society 43:437–464 
Mylan, J., Holmes, H, and Paddock, J. (2016) “Re-Introducing Consumption to the ‘Circular 
Economy’: A Sociotechnical Analysis of Domestic Food Provisioning” Sustainability 8, 794 
Warde, A. (2005) “Consumption and Theories of Practice” Journal of Consumer Culture 5 (2), pp. 131-
153 
Warde, A. and Southerton, D. (eds.) The Habits of Consumption. COLLeGIUM: Studies across 
Disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences vol 12. 
https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/34215 
Web References 
*EC (2015) Closing the Loop—An EU Action Plan for the Circular Economy. European 
Commission (COM614) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/circular-economy/index_en.htm 
*EMF (2013) “Towards the Circular Economy: Opportunities for the consumer goods sector “ 




Future-making as collective composition:  
towards an inclusive design of smart cities  
 
Maureen Meadows (Coventry University, Coventry, United Kingdom)  
Maureen.meadows@coventry.ac.uk 
 
Matthijs Kouw (Rathenau Instituut, The Hague, Netherlands) m.kouw@rathenau.nl 
Introduction: smart cities and the need for a visioning methodology 
It is becoming more and more difficult to avoid the notion of the ‘smart city’. In the discussions 
surrounding it, an optimistic and firm belief in the ability of ‘smart’ technologies drives efforts to 
enable efficient governance of urban public spaces, energy flows, and mobility patterns by such 
technologies. City officials and industrial actors around the world have joined forces to promote the 
endless possibilities of smart technologies in world expos, demonstration cities and smart city 
partnerships. The desire to design and construct smart cities is driven by an optimistic view of smart 
technologies, which is used as a catch-all term to refer to various information and communication 
technologies (ICTs), such as sensors, facilities processing 'big' data, wearable technologies, and 
autonomous vehicles. Implementing smart technologies, it is argued, will lead to more innovative 
and sustainable cities, and dramatically improve urban life through greener living spaces, more 
democratic modes of governance, and better health. 
 
This 'techno-optimism' that accompanies smart cities and smart technologies is increasingly criticised 
by urban social science scholars, who highlight risks such as increased private control over public 
spaces and the neglect of participation and engagement of civil society in formal decision making 
processes (Kitchin, 2014). Smart cities, some argue, is the trend du jour in top-down and technocratic 
approaches to urban planning that ignore the complexity and dynamics of everyday city life, and 
downplay social, entrepreneurial and community aspects of liveable and resilient cities. Those 
involved with the design of smart cities disagree about what a smart city is or should be, and 
diverging designs of future smart cities are proposed as the best way forward. This multiplicity of 
designs can render public debates about smart cities opaque and may even obscure the interests at 
play. We suggest that wide and effective stakeholder engagement is a key criterion when generating 
and debating a plurality of visions around what a future smart city might be. 
 
Following Throgmorton’s (1996, xxi) idea that urban planning is “persuasive storytelling within a web 
of relationships", future visions of smart cities can be aligned with governmental and commercial 
attempts to provide better lives for citizens through new and improved urban designs. In line with 
the aforementioned critiques advanced by urban social science scholars, we wish to develop an 
inclusive methodology for developing future visions of cities. We adopt Throgmorton's (1996) idea of 
urban planning as persuasive storytelling, but argue that the stories told need to be developed in 
collaboration with a variety of social groups. Thus, techno-optimism can be side-stepped in favour of 
an inclusive methodology that fosters a plurality of perspectives. Such a plurality of perspectives is 
needed to unleash the power of smart cities to confront the urban challenges of the future. It is not 
our aim to push technology aside carelessly, informed by Luddite angst or a romantic longing for 
times supposedly untainted by technological mediation. Rather, we frame technology as both a 
technical and profoundly social phenomenon that should be intertwined with the interests and 
perspectives of social groups affected by technological innovation.  
 
In developing the methodology, we draw on the work of Checkland and Holwell (1997), who propose 
that any research may be thought of as entailing the following elements: a framework of ideas (F), 
which are used in a methodology (M) to investigate an area of concern (A) (see Figure 1).  
 
 
[Source: based on Checkland and Holwell, 1997; reproduced in O’Brien and Meadows, 2007] 
 
The ‘methodology’ M is our proposed visioning methodology, which will be applied to A, our 'area of 
concern' which is to devise an effective, participative and creative process for situations where a 
plurality of values may be desirable. The ‘framework of ideas’, F, is a set of concepts which are 
introduced below. These include visions and visioning, multiple perspectives on the future, 
involvement and participation, and alternative futures.  
 
In deciding what to include in the framework of ideas, we are influenced by the need to explore a 
desirable future, while taking into account the opportunities, and challenges presented by the 
growing role of digital data, i.e., the availability of ‘big data’, the permeation of ICTs in the urban 
environment, the dissolution of the homogenous geographical entity of 'the city' and the increasing 
intertwining of cities with digital environments, etc.. Data-driven forms of urbanism that result from 
the intertwining of ICTs with the urban environment have become a global phenomenon, and have 
established the idea of cities as ‘knowable’ and ‘controllable’ environments. As a result, the 
operational governance of city services is becoming highly responsive to a form of networked 
urbanism in which big data systems prefigure and set the urban agenda, persistently driven by the 
promise of smart people, governance, mobility, sustainability, and cutting-edge innovation. Thus, the 
development of data-driven smart cities is primarily focused on technological promise, which may be 
at odds with broader societal concerns.  
 
We respond to the challenges of integrating these broader societal concerns in designing smart cities 
by developing a framework for assessing the inclusivity of future-making. We take the visioning 
literature as a starting point. The complexity of a case study situation, such as a ‘digital vision’ for a 
city, clearly raises the issue of the existence of multiple stakeholder groups who may not be able to 
come together in a single workshop setting. Hence, creative approaches to encouraging stakeholder 
engagement are required. Another key component of the framework of ideas is that of participation 
in the process, particularly in the context of identifying who should be involved and how to involve 
them in visioning. The relationship between scenario planning (a widely used approach to making 
flexible long term plans and robust strategic decisions) and visioning has been discussed in the 
management literature; thus the framework of ideas may consider how this literature might 
influence the design of the methodology. 
Visioning: a short summary 
While there are numerous examples of vision and visioning in practice in the business and 
management literature, no consensus has been reached around the definition of these terms. Many 
definitions emphasize the core concept of a vision as a preferred path or destination consciously 
chosen by an individual or group of individuals, which they can work towards achieving. Another way 
to consider them is as providing guidance about what core to preserve and what future to stimulate 
progress towards.  
 
Workable, winning visions do not just happen; they crucially depend on the vision development 
process itself. Moreover, if the vision is to produce results, it must be widely understood and 
enthusiastically embraced throughout the organisation. So what are the key issues in establishing a 
successful visioning process? Important questions include the type and sequence of steps to follow; 
who should be involved and how to involve them; whether to consider single or multiple visions of 
the future; and how to encourage creativity within the process.  
 
There are many recommended methods for vision development, which tend to differ in the sequence 
of steps they promote, but show general agreement on the content of the process as involving the 
following fundamental steps: 
 
1. Identification of stakeholders  
 
2. Analysis of the organisation’s current situation  
 
3. Identification of a desired future vision  
 
4. Comparison of the future vision with the current situation  
 
5. Development of action plans  
 
Visioning processes are often run with one or more representatives of different stakeholder groups, 
typically during a one-off workshop or event. The group analyses the present situation, and then 
goes on to develop a single shared vision of the future. This shared vision is contrasted with the 
current situation in order to develop action plans to take the organisation from the present to the 
future. In the design of future visions, these five steps can be considered as building blocks that help 
characterize the process.  
Multiple perspectives: participation and stakeholder involvement  
Successful visions must appeal to people, and inspire them to work towards the realisation of the 
vision. However, for this to happen, the visions must be widely understood and embraced. Another 
key issue, then, is the involvement and participation of the relevant stakeholders. Participation has 
multiple benefits; it provides those involved with a valuable opportunity to learn; it increases their 
commitment to action to realise the goals that have been articulated; and it enhances the 
implementability of the plans that emerge. Moreover, the more diverse the experiences of the 
participants, the more robust the set of visions they create.  
 
Identifying who should be involved in the process is clearly important, as is the issue of how to 
involve them. Stakeholders can be defined as persons or groups that impact on, or are impacted on 
by the organisation. It would seem logical therefore that key stakeholders should be invited to 
participate in the process.  It is important, via stakeholder analysis, to identify stakeholders who will, 
or can be persuaded to, support actively the strategic intent of the organisation, as well as those who 
will seek to sabotage the successful management of strategic intent. This reflects the notion that 
there may be important differences between stakeholders that benefit from the organisation’s 
strategic intent and those that are negatively affected by it. 
 
Next, we consider how different types of ‘future’ can be classified and whether it is desirable to 
consider more than one view of the future.  
Collective composition: scenarios and the CHOICES approach  
Ducot and Lubben (1980) provide a classification of different types of possible future, which they 
term scenario. The most common type of scenario is classed as descriptive and exploratory, and is 
often used in the assessment of future uncertainties concerning an organisation’s external 
environment. Such scenarios typically have an external orientation in relation to the organisation, 
and are based on people’s assessment of factual information. They are most often presented as sets 
of alternative views of the future external environment against which an organisation should develop 
a robust set of plans (in contrast to the practice of visioning, where a single vision of the future is 
usually produced). 
 
O’Brien and Meadows (1998) draw a distinction between strategic planning scenarios and visioning 
scenarios. The latter, in contrast to the former, are focused on the internal environment of the 
organisation and on issues over which the organisation has control. According to Ducot and Lubben’s 
typology mentioned above, they are exploratory, and also normative, meaning ‘subjective’ or values-
laden as they are intended to address the deep concerns of participating stakeholders. Indeed, 
visioning scenarios are developed from the initial viewpoints of the stakeholders, in such a way that 
each scenario represents a contrasting and strongly held perspective on the issues under 
consideration. The intention is not necessarily that a particular visioning scenario is chosen as ‘the 
way forward’. Rather, the set of visioning scenarios can act as a vehicle to promote informed debate. 
For instance, attention could be drawn to the possible trade-offs that might exist between different, 
often difficult, choices.  
 
A further but related distinction between strategic planning scenarios and visioning scenarios is the 
location of control (O’Brien and Meadows, 2007). Strategic planning scenarios describe future 
possible external environments that are largely out of the control of the organisation, whereas 
visioning scenarios describe possible future states of the organisation itself. Future research should 
reflect the difference between visioning for a single organization (e.g. as part of the strategic 
planning for a private business) and visioning for a city with its plethora of stakeholders and driving 
forces that have the potential to shape its future. We suggest that the scenario planning literature 
can assist us in developing visioning. First, it insists upon the explicit consideration of multiple views 
of the future; looking forward from any point in time, multiple possible futures exist, not just one. 
Second, the use of participation is key to the process of developing the scenarios; scenario 
development is a process of creating a shared language and understanding of future issues.  
 
We argue that it is desirable to consider different potential visions of the future as part of a 
participative journey towards creating a shared vision of the future. When involving multiple 
stakeholder groups, it is important to acknowledge that each group may be concerned about a 
different set of issues and hold a different and possibly conflicting set of values that could influence 
their choice of a preferred future. Put simply, each stakeholder group may have their own preferred 
vision for the future. When stakeholder groups are involved in developing and advancing visions for 
the future, they end up in a process of collective composition – a term we use to describe the 
process by which a plurality of social groups construct a vision of the future. 
 
O’Brien and Meadows (1998) describe the CHOICES approach to a public discourse project which 
develops and uses visioning scenarios as part of a participative journey toward creating a shared 
vision of the future. Table 1 shows the six phases of the CHOICES approach and outlines the key tasks 
and activities that are conducted during each phase. We propose this approach as a useful basis for 
future methodological developments. 
 
Phase Key Tasks Example actions from 
“Choices for Bristol” (see 




Establish project team, and identify drivers of 
need for change 
Steering group formed, 
funding proposal developed 
Issue 
Exploration 
Identify concerns of representative stakeholders  Focus groups held, seeking to 





Project team to produce a set of discussion 
materials containing a brief history of the 
organization and a summary of the current key 
issues and concerns, representing different 
stakeholder perspectives; an overview of the 
project process with timescales; a set of 
visioning scenarios, each describing a future 
nature or state of the organization from a 
contrasting perspective.  
Discussion materials 
prepared and 
checked/tested, including a 
set of questions to form the 
basis of planned 
conversations about the 




Disseminate and promote dialogue using the 
discussion materials. Generate ideas for action 
arising from discussion materials 
Discussion materials 
disseminated via a local 
newspaper, and in a targeted 
way by the project team 
Producing 
the vision 
Analyze and consolidate ideas for action. 
Encourage participation in developing a vision 
Over 2000 ideas for action 
fed into public meetings 




Commitment to action Booklet published and 
distributed; follow-up 
meetings held 
Table 1: Summary of the CHOICES approach (adapted from O’Brien and Meadows, 1998, 2007) 
 
In conclusion, we have set out above criteria and some resources for the development of a visioning 
methodology that is appropriate for addressing challenging questions such as the future of a city.  In 
setting an agenda for future work, we emphasise the need for a visioning methodology that 
addresses the challenge of including broader societal concerns in such situations, and draws on a 
wide range of stakeholders, while allowing for the possibility of multiple visions of the future. When 
this plurality of perspectives is included in telling the story of future smart cities, collective 
composition becomes possible. It is our hope that this ideal of collective composition will become to 
benchmark for developing the smart cities of the future. 
References  
 
Checkland, P. and Holwell, S. (1997). Information, Systems and Information Systems. Wiley: 
Chichester.  
 
Ducot, C. and Lubben, G.J. (1980). A typology for scenarios. Futures 12: 51–57.  
Kitchin, Rob. (2014). The Data Revolution: Big Data, Open Data, Data Infrastructures and Their 
Consequences. London: SAGE Publications. 
 
O’Brien, F.A. and Meadows, M (1998). Future visioning: a case study of a scenario based approach. 
In: Dyson RG and O’Brien FA (eds). Strategic Development: Methods and Models. Wiley: Chichester. 
pp 39–54.  
 
O’Brien, F.A. and Meadows, M. (2007) Developing a visioning methodology: Visioning Choices for the 
future of operational research. Journal of the Operational Research Society (2007) 58, 557–575. 
 
Throgmorton, J.A. (1996). Planning as Persuasive Storytelling: The rhetorical construction of Chicago’s 
electric future. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
 
